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Abstract 
 
 
For the past few years tax administration reforms are among top priorities of the Government of 
Armenia. One of key areas of tax administration relates to the issues of tax compliance which 
reflects all aspects of the relationship between taxpayers and the state. This paper basically focuses 
on the methodology of estimating tax compliance costs and provides a number of empirical 
findings obtained form a survey conducted among 306 Yerevan-based business enterprises. The 
paper provides also an analysis of administrative costs of tax collection, as well as international 
comparisons in this regard. It has been prepared based on the relevant report elaborated by the 
Armenian European Policy and Legal Advice Centre (AEPLAC).  
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Introduction 
Fiscal policy directly affects the use of aggregate resources in the economy and the level 
of aggregate demand. Together with the monetary policy, it also has an impact on the 
balance of payment, public debt levels as well as the rates of inflation and economic 
growth. In general, the fiscal policy influences the behaviour of producers and consumers, 
as well as the distribution of income and economic welfare. Substantial macroeconomic 
imbalances - both internal and external – may often be explained also by fiscal imbalance. 
Tax systems are considered efficient when they provide revenue targets with minimum 
negative effect on economic efficiency of operators in the market.1 The efficiency of tax 
system depends not only on a clearly defined and prudent tax policy, but also on the 
efficiency of tax administration itself, which plays a key role in the efficient 
implementation of this policy and achievement of its objectives. Despite widely accepted 
principles of tax administration2, there are several factors (such as economic structure, 
level of institutional development of a particular country, national mentality, etc.) which 
should also be taken into consideration.  
Tax administration implies two directions i.e. tax collection process by the state and tax 
compliance by taxpayers. The problems of tax compliance are always in acute interest 
among economists since they imply different types of taxpayers’ behaviour stipulated by 
economic, sociological and psychological motivations, on one hand, and inseparably 
connected with interactions between the state and taxpayers, on the other hand, which 
entails vulnerable, sometimes hidden aspects of state-taxpayers relations. In economic 
literature the problem of tax compliance is discussed in different ways. The most common 
approach considers the tax compliance in the context of “tax gap”, which represents the 
difference between actual revenue collected and the amount to be collected in case of 
100% compliance. Brown and Mazur (2003) state that tax compliance consists of three 
separate components: payment compliance, filing compliance and reporting compliance, 
which in their turn are “three mutually exclusive and exhaustive measures”. In this 
context, another issue to be considered is whether compliance implies voluntary or 
compulsory behaviour, i.e. which one might be considered as full compliance.  Tax 
compliance can also be treated in the light of tax avoidance and tax evasion, which are 
                                                 
1 This problem is very actual because in many cases the distribution of income in the 
economy from economic entities to the state has a negative effect mainly due to 
ineffective tax administration. 
2 Henri Lorie “Priorities for Further Fiscal Reforms in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States ” IMF WP/03/209 
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conceptually distinguished activities in terms of legality, i.e. considering avoidance as a 
legal measure to reduce tax liability and evasion as illegal measure (Allingham and 
Sandmo 1972). Reviewing an economic literature and approaches of different authors, it 
becomes obvious that the phenomenon of tax compliance will never find its absolute 
“solution”, nevertheless economic researches will help to find the “best” options for the 
solution of the problem. One of the mentioned options is the notion of costs arising during 
tax compliance, which is a key aspect of this paper. 
Generally, the “state-taxpayers” interrelation logically bears costs which can be separated 
into administrative and compliance costs. Administrative costs are the costs to the 
government derived during tax collection process, while compliance costs are overall 
resources spent by taxpayers in meeting their tax obligations. These two types of costs, as 
a whole, are considered as operation costs of a tax system, which is identical to the notion 
of transaction costs of market activities (Binh Tran-Nam et al 2000). According to Evans 
and Walpole (1997), overall costs of a tax system include “welfare costs, opportunity 
costs, social costs and so on”. Another opinion states that in order to estimate total impact 
of taxes on the society “the total sacrifice imposed upon the populace-total collection 
costs, administrative and compliance costs, should be looked into” (Mikesell 1986). Tax 
compliance costs along with administrative costs, deadweight efficiency loss from 
taxation, the excess burden of tax evasion and avoidance costs is being considered as one 
of the five component costs of taxation (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 1996). These statements 
clearly prove the importance of compliance costs for effective functioning of the entire tax 
system.  
In regard to the definition of tax compliance costs, it should be mentioned that with 
reference to authoritative sources we can conclude that tax compliance costs can be 
defined as “costs incurred by taxpayers, or third parties such as businesses, in meeting the 
requirements laid upon them in complying with a given structure and level of tax” 
(Sandford et al 1989.) or “all costs due to the tax system borne by taxpayers and third 
parties other than cost arising from economic distortions and equity violations” (Saumen 
Chattopadhyay and Arindam Da-Gupta, 2002). Summarizing, it can be concluded that 
compliance costs are the overall costs to be carried by taxpayers as a result of “state-
taxpayer” interrelation.   
Despite the fact that modern principles of tax simplicity have been initially discussed by 
Adam Smith3, the first attempt to estimate tax compliance costs took place 70 years ago 
                                                 
3 “…as the certainty, convenience and economy canons of good tax policy…” (1776; 
Book five, Chapter II) 
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(Haig 1935).  This was basically stipulated by several reasons: a) tax compliance costs 
have been though to be insignificant; b) there was no neat and formal model of 
compliance costs minimization; c) tax compliance cost estimates typically require 
painstaking research involving collection of large amounts of data not available from 
published sources (Binh Tran-Nam et al. 2000). However, the situation has been changed, 
and since 1960s around 50 studies of compliance costs of companies in around 20 
different counties have been conducted.4 Sandford (1995) explains the growing interest 
toward estimation of tax compliance costs through the following: a) changes in technology 
(facilitating large-scale computer-driven surveys), b) introduction of value added tax 
(VAT) regimes in a number of countries (with high and visible compliance costs), c) 
growth of enterprise cultures involving the small business sector (where compliance costs 
are particularly onerous), d) increasing complexity of tax systems. The main findings of 
conducted researches proved that: compliance costs are quite significant and have highly 
regressive nature with great variation among different types of taxes. Recent developments 
in worldwide tax policy reforms show that there is a trend in tax compliance policies, with 
initiatives by a number of tax authorities, to move towards a more taxpayer oriented 
approach (S. James et al. 2003). This statement inevitably leads to the idea that the 
researches on estimation of compliance costs have a great importance since they provide a 
key instrument for elaboration and further improvement of tax administration policy.  
Regarding Armenia, it should be mentioned that tax administration reforms serve as a key 
indicator of successful implementation of country-wide reforms. Many international 
organizations (IMF, WB, and USAID) have focused their activities to providing technical 
assistance to the State Tax Service. For that purpose, several reports and working papers 
have been prepared and submitted to the Government of Armenia. However no researches 
on estimation of tax compliance costs have been conducted yet and this research is the 
first attempt to provide quantitative measurement of tax compliance costs in Armenia 
along with the assessment of administrative costs in Armenia.5 This will allow finding out 
how “costly” it is for economic entities to meet their tax obligations since there is a 
conventional wisdom that “the lower tax compliance costs are, the stronger becomes the 
incentive of taxpayers to pay taxes”. It will also allow to define all aspects and details 
(sometimes invisible) of the relations between the tax authority and the economic entities, 
as well as to reveal the shortcomings of tax administration and to identify the ways to 
increase the efficiency of tax policy. Finally, we hope that the research will serve as basis 
                                                 
4 See Saumen Chattopadhyay and Arindam Da-Gupta “The Income Tax Compliance Cost 
of Indian Corporations ” Annex 1.1, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, 2002.  
5  In this research we have considered only the tax compliance by businesses since the 
reporting system of tax obligations by persons is not developed yet in Armenia.   
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for future similar researches aimed at providing new incentives for improvement of tax 
administration in Armenia.   
Methodology for Estimation of Transaction Costs of Tax Collection  
Logically, the methodological basis of tax compliance cost’s estimation lies behind the 
definition of compliance costs itself. By reviewing the proposed methodologies, it 
becomes apparent that the main difference between these methodologies is the number of 
tax compliance costs components. This is mainly stipulated by the fact that the structure 
and operational scheme of the tax systems of different countries are not the same, and the 
economic realities of different countries not always allow applying all components of the 
theory. Generally, tax compliance costs for businesses comprise in-house personnel costs, 
other in-house costs (non-labor costs) and external costs. It is important to put a 
distinguishing line between gross and net compliance costs, which is stipulated by cash 
flow benefit and tax deductibility components (Allers 1994). Compliance costs are also 
treated in the light of computational and tax planning costs (Johnston, 1963). These costs 
can also be divided into commencement (once-only) and recurrent (regular) costs 
(Sandford 1989).  Some researches consider also psychic costs, including mental stress 
suffered by the internal staff during tax compliance, as well as mandatory elements, 
voluntary and quasi-voluntary costs (Saumen Chattopadhyay and Arindam Da-Gupta, 
2002). Our methodological approach is unambiguously based on internationally accepted 
methodologies; however we have decided to propose a slightly different approach. 
Analyzing the methodologies applied, we have come to a conclusion that tax compliance 
costs are in strong correlation with the notion of transaction costs, since we believe, that 
both imply costs of functioning of tax compliance mechanism.6 Therefore, the definition 
of tax compliance costs can be interpreted as “transaction costs derived during tax 
compliance”. Considering this approach, we have decided to develop our methodology of 
estimating tax compliance costs on the basis of the conceptual components of the theory of 
transaction costs.7 The theory suggests different types of transaction costs, but they are 
                                                 
6  The basic principles of the theory of transaction costs (neo-institutionalism) have been 
formulated by R. Coase in 1937 (R. Coase “The Nature of Firm”). According to Coase, 
transaction costs are “the costs of exploitation of the mechanisms of market economy” or 
“costs that relate to the time, effort and other resources needed to search out, negotiate and 
consummate an exchange”. Currently, many experts have come to a conclusion that 
transaction costs in general are “the costs of functioning of an economic system”, which 
implies any costs derived as a result of interrelation of economic agents regardless where 
it has occurred.    
7  Our methodology considers approximately all features of taxation procedure in Armenia 
and deliberately omits the components of transaction costs, which cannot be estimated due 
to the unavailability of relevant information.   
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primarily classified and grouped as: a) costs of obtaining information, b) costs of 
negotiations, c) costs of measurement, d) costs of protecting property rights, e) costs of 
opportunistic behaviour.  
All these components have been “adjusted” to the process of tax compliance and, finally, 
we have come to the following conclusions.8   
Costs of obtaining information are indispensable expenses incurred by economic entities 
related to the acquisition of all documents necessary for submission to the tax authority 
and for tax inspection procedures. These documents include cash operation books, sales 
books and incoming goods books, as well as other documents required for preparation of 
financial statements. Among these costs are those related to the purchasing of publications 
(official or non official) or e-packages on tax legislation (including expenses for updating 
of these packages) and relevant advisory services as well as personnel training.9   
Costs of negotiation are financial resources and time needed to establish “good” relations 
with representatives of the tax authority, including costs connected with business meetings 
(lunches), etc. Here we can also add the extra salaries paid to an accountant or other 
employee to establish and maintain “good” relations with the tax authority.  
It should be noted that the factor of time plays an important role in the estimation of 
negotiation costs. The time factor implies the overall duration needed to establish “good” 
relations with tax officers. This type of costs is considered as bribe costs in compliance 
costs theory.10  
 Costs of measurement include time11 for preparation of a package of documents to be 
submitted to the tax authority and related expenses such as salary paid to an accountant or 
                                                 
8  Mathematical expressions of transaction costs calculation can be found in annex 1.  
9  Comparing with the theory of compliance costs, the costs of obtaining information will 
be included in the internal costs component. 
10 The phenomenon of negotiation/bribe costs is typical for developing countries where the 
institutional system is not that developed and strong. Therefore, it is reasonable to include 
these costs as a component of transaction costs. The term “bribe” has been willfully 
excluded from the questionnaire since it has been proved that businesses are reluctant to 
provide information about it. 
11 When calculating the measurement costs, a coefficient of 0.5 was used to estimate the 
working time spent by relevant specialists. No special inquiry has been made to the 
economic entities for the calculation of this coefficient (expecting that it would be rather 
difficult for them to give an answer). Nevertheless, we have used this coefficient based on 
the experience of Croatia and logical calculations. 
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other specialist performing these functions, as well as other costs related to the submission 
of these documents to the tax authority.12 We can also include here the expenses on 
purchase of e-packages on accountancy. In some cases the time to be spent on submitting 
these documents to the tax authorities should also be considered.13  
Costs of protection of property rights are all those expenses connected with hiring of 
lawyers, accountants and other professional staff members dealing with protection of 
property rights of economic entities during lawsuits and tax inspection processes. Here it 
may be included also the costs related to these procedures. With this respect, we can 
mention extra salaries paid to a skilled accountant who is aware of the shortcomings of tax 
legislation and can interpret it in favour of the interests of the economic entity (e.g. reduce 
taxable profit).14 An extra salary for accountant refers to avoidable or voluntary 
compliance costs (tax planning costs). We share the standpoint of the vast majority of 
researches that there is no strict border-line between avoidable and unavoidable 
(mandatory) costs and in practice it is very difficult to clearly distinguish them.15    
 
                                                 
12 Here it is important to consider a possible accounting/taxation overlap. The matter is 
that there might be cases when businesses consider all costs derived from preparation of 
accounting reports as compliance costs, or they consider preparation of accounting reports 
just as a final step of regular accounting procedure.   
13 Sometimes it takes 2-3 days for chief accountants of companies to submit all necessary 
documents because of having to stand in tiresome queues.     
14 The salary of accountants and lawyers implies the “composition” of three pillars, each of 
which represents the merit-based contribution of the specialist. For example, the first pillar 
is the “good” connections with the tax authority or the court, the second pillar is the 
implementation of current duties and responsibilities, and the third pillar is the “skills” to 
protect property rights.     
15 It is obvious, that an accountant may receive an extra salary if the expected benefit from 
tax planning exceeds the expected costs. However, tax planning has a negative effect on 
the society, since the benefit from tax planning logically implies reduction in tax revenues.    
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Costs of opportunistic behaviour16 These costs are emerged due to asymmetric 
information (information available to one party and unavailable or partially available to 
the other one) between the economic entity and the tax authority, meanwhile the entity and 
the tax authority act “by pursuing their own interests”. This implies that both the economic 
entity and the tax authority try to gain as much “benefit” as possible (act as a “profit 
maximising firm”), meaning that the transaction costs for economic entity emerge as a 
result of opportunistic behaviour of the tax authority. It should be noted that the costs of 
opportunistic behaviour are one of the key elements of tax administration since they reveal 
all sensitive and vulnerable aspects of the relations between the tax authority as a 
authorised state body and the taxpayer as an accountable body (in terms of tax 
obligations).  
Thus, the costs of opportunistic behaviour17 for economic entities may include various 
types. The first one is the interest accrued on VAT advance payments to the State Budget 
(advance payments are subject to further tax clearance) if the economic entity fails to 
make this advance payment.18 The second is the accrued interest of VAT on exports 
subject to a refund from the State Budget, if VAT is not reimbursed in a timely and due 
manner. The third is the sum overpaid by the economic entity to the State Budget, which is 
imposed during tax inspections under the discretionary power of tax officers. The forth, is 
the percentage over the sum of positive difference between the prepaid profit tax (which is 
                                                 
16 Issues such as private information, moral hazard and adverse selection, which lead to 
shortcomings of tax administration, can be caused by opportunistic behaviour. These three 
problems result in higher transaction costs both for the tax authority and the taxpayers. 
Hence, the main objective of tax administration is to undertake measures aimed at 
reducing and, perhaps, eliminating these shortcomings or creating stronger incentives for a 
“good” behaviour of both parties, which will lead to a decrease in the level of tax evasion 
and an increase in the level of effectiveness of tax administration. At the same time, tax 
reforms should minimise the legislation enforcement costs for the tax authority and the 
costs of voluntary compliance for taxpayers. 
17 To calculate the opportunistic behaviour costs, we have used 11.6% interest rate (the 
interest rate of treasury bills issued in 2003) 
18 The right to impose advance payments is the result of tax authority’s discretionary 
power. Nevertheless, if the economic entities are well informed about their rights and 
undertake the necessary measures to protect their interests, the level of opportunistic 
behavior of the tax authority would be significantly lower (but it can be assumed that in 
this case there will be additional transaction costs, and in this case the figure of “net 
benefit” from this action may be considered as a criterion of effectiveness).      
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1/16 part of the real profit of the last year, to be paid on monthly basis)19 and real profit tax 
(based on the profit of current year) which is the subject of reimbursement20 by the state.21  
Estimation of transaction costs22
Before analysing the findings of transaction costs estimation, it is interesting to observe 
the dynamics of average payments of taxes per employee illustrated below: 
 
Chart 1: Average payments of taxes per employee 
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As it can be seen from this chart, depending on the number of employees the taxes paid 
per employee significantly differ in companies. For instance, according to this indicator, 
taxes paid by companies with one employee are nearly 3.5 times more than those paid by 
companies with more than 101 employees. As the amount of taxes paid is directly 
correlated with the volume of sales, we can assume that this indicator also reflects, to 
some extent, the effectiveness of the companies’ activities (labour productivity) and the 
level of tax compliance. However, in our view, it rather indicates another phenomenon: 
medium business is the target of tax administration and, hence, it finds itself in an 
unfavourable competitive position compared to the other groups.  
                                                 
19 The Law of the Republic of Armenia “On Profit Tax”, Article 47(2) 
20 The Law of the Republic of Armenia “On Profit Tax”, Article 47(8) 
21 This situation is stipulated not by the opportunistic behaviour of the tax authority but 
rather by the provisions of the relevant law. However, in some cases the mentioned sum 
has not been reimbursed and has been subjected to further clearance. 
22 Detailed explanation of the questionnaire design and sample selection is provided in 
Annex 2 
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 Within the scope of this study, it would have been valuable to analyse the tax burden for 
economic sectors, which is calculated as a ratio of taxes paid by the relevant sectors to the 
volume of sales. According to estimations, this indicator accounts for 20% in industry, 
3.3% in construction, nearly 2% in wholesale and retail trade, and 6.4% in services.23 It 
appears that the sector most “suffered” because of the activities of the tax system is 
industry, while services and retail/wholesale sectors are in a relatively “good” situation. 
This is quite logical since industry is running mainly under regular tax regime, while 
commercial and service companies operate under a simplified tax regime. In this regard it 
is notable that overall transaction costs in industry sectors (annex 5) are high as well, 
which points out the fact that high tax burden entails high transaction costs.  
Analysis of average transaction costs indicates that the information gathering costs and 
measurement costs account for the highest percentage share of the average transaction 
costs of companies. There is a threshold after which the average transaction costs in 
various groups exceed the overall average (primarily in medium-sized enterprises having 
11-50 employees and 10.1-50 million AMD turnover and those that pay 500-5,000 
thousand AMD in taxes).  
Let us now analyse the overall level (gross) of transaction costs. As it can be seen from the 
data in annex 6, information gathering and measurement costs have the highest percentage 
share in overall amount of transaction costs (as in the case of average transaction costs) 
accounting for 74.4% and 17.4%, respectively. In hierarchic order they are followed by the 
opportunistic behaviour costs (3.9%), property rights’ protection costs (2.5%) and 
negotiation costs (1.9%).24 It is logical that the largest share of transaction costs falls to 
the share of measurement costs since these are incurred “regularly” and their amount 
directly relates to the level of efficient financial management. The same can be said about 
the costs of obtaining information, a part of which also incur regularly, while the                        
inclusion of some components depends on the overall level of companies’ development 
and the efficiency of management. The opportunistic behaviour costs rank the third 
(though these are not that large in terms of their share), which implies that the drawbacks 
of tax administration are rather “costly” for economic entities. The mentioned percentage 
share of property rights protection costs definitely prove that the level of institutional 
                                                 
23 This indicator was calculated using the data on the companies that provided answers to 
both groups of questions (taxes paid and sales volume). 
24 International experience shows that, in general, measurement costs have the largest 
share in overall transaction costs. 
 9
development in our business community is still far from being satisfactory (concerning the 
protection of rights in the courts). As it was said, the negotiation costs could have a higher 
percentage share in total costs; however, the sources for the emergence of such costs are 
considered to be among the most sensitive, complex and confidential problems of the 
business community and, perhaps, this fact affected the “sincerity” of the respondents’ 
answers. 
Transaction costs at national level have been calculated using the classical extrapolation 
method, as a result of which the overall transaction costs of economy accounted to 
13,538.4 million AMD or about 0.8% of GDP for 2003.25 As the sector of agriculture is 
almost tax-exempt, we can deduct the agricultural products from GDP and, by calculating 
the share of transaction costs in this amount, we will obtain 1.1%. These two figures are 
not that high, but their numerical expression is rather significant.26  
Another integrated indicator which delineates the “impact” of transaction costs to 
taxpayer’s activity is the average level of transaction costs as a share in the total taxes 
paid, which, according to estimations, comprises 11.5%.27 It can be said that this figure is 
not quite high as compared with the same indicator in developed countries, which, 
according to some estimates, is 10-13%.28
As to the average figure for transaction costs per employee, the chart below shows that the 
larger the company is (the more employees it has), the lower are the transaction costs per 
                                                 
25 The transaction costs for the whole economy have been estimated in the following way: 
first, we take taxes collected by STS in 2003 (117,725.6 mln AMD), assuming that these 
were paid by all economic entities operating in the country, then we calculate 11.5% share 
of transaction costs in this amount. This brings 13,538.4 mln AMD and accounts for 0.8% 
of GDP indicator (1,618,577 mln AMD) for 2003. We can use the following alternative 
model: calculate transaction costs of 41,000 actual taxpayers using a classical 
extrapolation method (if we have figures for transaction costs of 302 entities, we can 
easily calculate the amount for the total number of actual taxpayers) and estimate its share 
in GDP. Note that the amount of overall transaction costs estimated by this method is 
16,264.9 mln AMD and differs from the one calculated by the first method only by 16%. 
This, in its turn, shows that the selected sample is representative. If we take the amount of 
total tax revenues of 2003 – 212.2 bln AMD, then this indicator will account for 1.5% of 
GDP.       
26 Note that in Croatia this indicator is 1.2%, in Australia - 1.36%.  
27 In Australia this figure was 7%. 
28 See Luigi Alberto Franzoni  “Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance” 
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employee.29 For instance, in an entity with one employee this indicator is 51 times more 
than in companies with more than 101 employees.30
 
Chart 2: Average transaction costs per employee. 
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When analysing the dynamics of the average share of transaction costs in the taxes paid, in 
terms of the increase in sales volumes and the number of employees (annex 3), we see that 
it has a tendency to decline (in companies with less than 1 million AMD turnover this 
figure exceeds 21 times the figure of the companies with more than 500 million AMD 
turnover, while in the entities with one employee it exceeds 20 times the same indicator 
for companies employing more than 101 people).  
As a general conclusion, we can say that in terms of the share of transaction costs per 
employee and the taxes paid, on the whole, these are more “costly” for small and medium 
enterprises.31
Further statements provide the main findings and conclusions emerged during survey 
process and cross-tab analysis between various sub-groups included in the questionnaire, 
which will serve as a basis for our recommendations.   
                                                 
29 This fact is generally in line with the international experience which shows that 
transaction costs are of regressive nature.   
30 In the survey conducted in Croatia, this difference was 62 times.  
31 This statement is in line with the main findings of researches conducted in other 
countries and confirms regressive nature of tax compliance costs. 
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It is obvious that the database of the State Tax Service needs to be regularly updated. The 
current situation does not allow tax authorities to clearly identify taxpayers and as a 
consequence it creates an additional burden for them which affects the overall cost 
efficiency of tax administration.  
The fact that a large number of companies refused to participate in the survey, as well as 
the negative “attitude” of the representative of these companies towards the subject of the 
survey illustrate that tax administration is one of the most painful and sensitive issues for 
economic entities and “business culture”, which we consider an important precondition for 
a successful tax administration, and it is still at quite a low level in Armenia’s business 
reality.  
Cross-tab analysis has led to the conclusion that the largest expenditures on information 
gathering fall to the share of companies running in the industry sector; since empirical 
analysis evidenced that the industry sector carries the heaviest burden of taxation. It can be 
assumed that the better the entities are informed about the tax system, the less they are 
exposed to the opportunistic behaviour of tax authorities as an increase in information 
gathering costs contributes to a decrease in the “expensiveness” of contacts with tax 
authorities. This inevitably leads to an idea that businesses should pay more attention and 
allocate more financial resources for raising awareness on tax legislation and tax system 
functioning, since the feedback from this will be tangibly more.   
Expensiveness” of contacts with tax authorities, drawbacks of tax legislation and the 
“unfriendly” attitude of tax officers are the main reasons which “force” economic entities 
to establish “good” relations with tax authorities. This remains as a key problem for 
Armenian business reality and creates serious obstacles for policy reforms, since, even at 
the theoretical base, it is very difficult to find effective measures to fight against collusive 
practices between tax inspectors and businesses.  
Opportunistic behaviour of tax authorities as a result of utilization of discretionary power 
is basically stipulated by imperfect tax legislation and the costs emerged in this regard is 
considered to be the other vulnerable point of “state-taxpayer” relations. As a 
countervailing measure, an appeal to the court can be considered.32 However, the survey 
results show that a judicial procedure is comparatively “costly” (in terms of both money 
and time) and it is a serious obstacle for the actions of economic entities in the context of 
protecting their rights. This stipulates that large taxpayers are settling their “problems” 
with tax authorities in a “roundabout way”. It means that small and medium businesses are 
                                                 
32 The main reasons for tax-related disputes are as follows: drawbacks of tax legislation, 
advanced payments levied by tax authorities, the “unfriendly” attitude of tax officers. 
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in a disadvantaged position. This problem requires a systematic institutional approach at 
national level in order to be effectively solved. Related to costs of opportunistic behaviour, 
it is notable that due to the collection of advance payments, the economy has lost about 1 
million dollars in investments33. Additionally, most companies that paid advanced 
payments have not filed a lawsuit since they have always agreed with the findings of tax 
inspection, i.e. the opportunistic behavior of tax authorities has, in its turn, provided some 
“guaranty” for economic entities. 
Detailed analysis of survey data shows that dissatisfaction with the tax system depends 
also on the frequency of inspections. Moreover, empirical analyses speak about the 
absence of direct correlation between the amounts of collected taxes and the frequency of 
tax inspections.34 This phenomenon reflects the main findings provided in economic 
literature, i.e. “at the optimum, effective taxation is regressive and the audit function is 
non-increasing in reported income” (L. Franzoni 1998). Survey results prove the necessity 
of additional salary to be paid to skilled accountants, as relations with tax authorities are 
more costly.      
Administrative costs and efficiency of tax administration 
According to economic literature, various methods are used for evaluation of the 
efficiency of tax administration. Based on these methods, the main indicators reflecting 
the efficiency of tax administration in 2002-2003 in Armenia have been calculated. These 
figures are given below.35    
   
Table 1:  Indicators of tax administration efficiency in Armenia 
 
Indicators 2002 2003 
Percentage 
growth as to 
the previous 
year 
GDP (mln AMD)36 1,362,471.7 1,624,642.7 19.2 
                                                 
33 This is an approximate figure. First, 0.28% of GPD was calculated, then the result was 
multiplied by 0.236 coefficient (investments accounted for 23.6% of aggregate demand in 
2003) and then the product was multiplied by 1/3 (the average period of advance payment 
clearance  is 80 days, which equals to one-third of working days per year). 
34 Tax revenue per employee was taken as a tax revenue indicator. 
35 The data have been provided by the State Tax Service under the Government of 
Armenia.  
36 We consider here the value of nominal GDP to ensure the “compatibility” with the 
amount of tax collections. 
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Number of employees (people) 1,779 1,774 -0.3 
Total costs of tax authority (thousand 
AMD)37 1 773 835 3,816,636 115.2 
of which, the salaries (thousand 
AMD) 961 905 2,396,090 149.1 
Average costs per employee/salary 
(thousand AMD) 541 1,351 149.8 
Overall average costs per employee 
(thousand AMD) 997 2,151 115,8 
Amount of collected taxes (bln 
AMD) 105,8 117,7 11.2 
Administrative costs/ tax revenues 
(cost of collection ratio, %) 1.7 3.24 93.4 
% change in tax revenues/% change 
in administrative costs  - 0,10  - 
Tax buoyancy (% change in tax 
revenues/% change in GDP) - 0.58 - 
Net tax revenues (thousand AMD) 104,026,166 
 
113,883,364 
 
9.5 
Tax revenues per employee  
(thousand AMD) 59,472 66,347 11.6 
 
As illustrated above, the number of employees of the tax system remained unchanged 
during the period and the changes in their number were only (–3%). However, the amount 
of collected taxes increased by 11.2%. Apparently, the productivity of the tax authority 
increased (taking into account the change in tax revenues and the number of employees).38 
It is also indirectly proved by the amount of tax revenues per employee, which has 
increased by 11.6%.  However, we should consider here the costs derived during tax 
collection, which increased by 115% or 2.15 times. With this respect, we can refer to an 
estimation method used worldwide – the cost of collection ratio.39 During the period in 
question this ratio almost doubled and reached 93.4%, which suggests an excessive growth 
in the expenses incurred by the tax authority over its tax collections.40 This pattern is also 
illustrated by another figure, which indicates the ratio of percentage changes in tax 
revenues to the percentage changes in expenses incurred by the tax authority and equals to 
                                                 
37 Expenditures directed to the tax system include both budgetary and off-budget 
financing.  
38 Despite one of the classical ways to estimate the productivity implies the changes in the 
working time spent. 
39 This ratio is also interpreted as a coefficient of unit labour cost.   
40 In 2002-2003 the salaries of tax officers rose 3.6 times or by 266% at the cost of the 
State Budget (certainly, to assess the well-being of employees we should consider the 
dynamics of price changes as well). 
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0.1 (the criterion of efficiency is the ratio above 1). Based on these findings, we can 
assume that during the concerned period the tax administration was in general inefficient 
(despite the fact that the overall amount of net tax revenues increased by 9.5%).41 
However, it should be noted that these ratios do not always reflect objectively the real 
situation.42 In this regard it is notable that the efficiency of tax administration implies a 
certain level of salaries paid to the tax officers, which will raise their material interests and 
reduce the possibility of illegal use of “discretionary power”.43 The analyses carried out 
would have been incomplete if we would evaluate the tax administration efficiency apart 
from the economic growth, i.e. without addressing the “tax buoyancy” (a type of tax 
elasticity), which indicates the “feedback” of the tax system in regard to the economic 
growth rate. As we see, during the concerned period this indicator was 0.58 (certainly, if 
we consider the tax revenues from all sources, this indicator will be slightly higher), which 
is a low figure suggesting that economic growth does not ensure an appropriate level of 
growth of tax revenues. Here, of course, we should take into account the preferential 
sectors in terms of taxation. However, it is obvious that the tax administration 
improvement policy should be implemented on a continuous basis. 
The abovementioned analysis shows that transaction costs of businesses are large relative 
to tax administration costs (approximately 3.6 times).   
Comparative Statistics 
It is interesting to analyse the statistical data relating to tax administration in different 
countries. The analysis of statistics consists of two parts: first, we present the relevant 
statistical data of CIS countries, and then the data on the mentioned field of OECD 
countries. 
                                                 
41 Certainly, the increase in salaries should be accompanied with relevant institutional 
changes, and if we analyse in the future the ratio of expenses made on tax authorities to 
the amount of taxes collected for 2004-2005, it will be possible to find out whether the 
sharp increase in the expenses directed to the tax authorities has secured an adequate level 
of tax collections in 2002-2003.  
42 International literature indicates the following factors as possible reasons: changes in tax 
rates, changes in macroeconomic situation, dramatic increase in tax authorities’ expenses 
(mainly capital), etc. It also points the fact that as this indicator does not estimate the tax 
potential, it has limited capacity to reflect the efficiency of tax administration (See Tax 
Administration in OECD Countries: Comparative Information Series 2004). 
43 Indeed, in case of absence or inadequate level of punishment measures, this action will 
not lead to the desired outcome. 
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The data describing the tax administration in CIS countries are shown in annex 4.44 It 
should be noted that we calculated the indicators for the overall efficiency of tax 
administration using the statistical data. The Table illustrates that in 2002-2003 an 
increase in tax revenues was reported in all CIS countries, particularly in Kazakhstan 
(36%), Moldova (24.4%) and Russia (21.2%).45 As to the level of tax administration costs, 
they also went up during this period in almost all countries, except Kazakhstan, where 
these costs decreased by 22.1%, and Georgia, where it accounted for (–7.5%). However, it 
should be said that no CIS country has reported such a significant level of growth in the 
expenses of the tax authorities as Armenia.46 This also explains the unprecedented 
increase in the cost of collection ratio in Armenia. Unlike Armenia, three CIS countries - 
Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine – reported a slight growth in this ratio (0.07% on 
average). In other countries, the cost of collection ratio, i.e. the unit labour cost, decreased. 
Generally, the CIS countries may be divided into two groups by the cost of collection 
ratio: countries, where this ratio is between 0 and 1, and countries where it is above 1, 
which can be considered as a threshold for estimation of relative efficiency. However, this 
is certainly a conventional division and does not reflect the real ratio for efficiency of tax 
administration (because it does not reflect the ratio of tax gap). The analysis of another 
indicator of tax administration efficiency (ratio of percentage change in tax revenues to 
percentage change in the costs of tax authorities) shows that the most “efficient” authority 
in terms of an absolute value is that of Moldova. In all countries, except Georgia, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Ukraine, the ratio of tax buoyancy is above 1, which implies that the 
percentage change in tax revenues exceeds that in GDP. Comparing all indicators of tax 
administration efficiency, we can see that among CIS countries, Kazakhstan is in a 
favourable situation in terms of tax administration efficiency. 
 In OECD countries the cost of collection ratio tended to increase slightly in 2000-200247, 
which may imply (other things being equal) that the tax administration in these countries 
becomes more expensive, which in its turn may be explained by the problems existing in 
                                                 
44 The materials of the CIS Statistics Committee, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund have been used as sources for information on the tax systems of CIS 
countries. 
45 Based on the statistical data about different countries placed on the WB official website 
and provided in the report on “World Development Indicators 2005”, we come to a 
conclusion that the amount of tax revenues of Belarus, Georgia and Kazakhstan indicated 
in Table 40 has not been collected by the tax authorities only.  
46 In our view, in terms of tax reforms and improvement tax administration efficiency, 
temporarily, this fact is in “favour” of Armenia.  
47 See Tax Administration in OECD Countries: Comparative Information Series (2004) 
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this area.48 It is interesting that in all Scandinavian countries this indicator is less than 1%, 
which is quite logical since the tax burden is rather heavy in these countries. As a rule, the 
cost of collection ratio of observed countries is within the range of 0-2%. The only 
country, which passes the 2% threshold for this indicator, is the Czech Republic. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Summarising the main conclusions drawn from the survey findings, we will try to 
formulate the following key points: 
The shortcomings of tax legislation and tax administration have an adverse effect, first of 
all, on medium-sized businesses, as small businesses fall out of the focus of “attention” 
due to their size, while the large ones are generally “inaccessible” for tax authorities. 
Indeed, medium-sized businesses are the units that carry “on their shoulders” the tax 
burden of the economy. In these circumstances, large companies obtain competitive 
advantages and strengthen their market power. This will have an undesirable impact on 
the efforts aimed at ensuring sustainable economic growth, particularly, by concentrating 
within certain groups and increasing the degree of inequality. Under these circumstances, 
an increase in expenditures directed to the tax administration will be inefficient compared 
to the GDP growth as long as the main target of tax authorities’ efforts is the medium-
sized business. Hence, the tax administration needs serious institutional changes; 
otherwise the macroeconomic achievements of the government shall not bring to 
sustainable economic growth.  
For further implementation of tax administration reforms, we make the following 
recommendations, which are conceptually based on the principle that the tax system 
should be a preventive and consulting body rather than a “punishing” one. 
1. In order to update the tax database and provide a more accurate information on 
economic entities, it is suggested to reregister the companies (within a certain 
period of time, by setting a specific deadline); as a result of which, the database 
will “get rid” of the companies that have stopped their economic activities. This 
measure will substantially ease the work of tax authorities by reducing the 
additional time and resources needed for the identification of economic entities 
and preventing the non-existent companies from making illegal deals. The 
reregistered companies will be provided with new TINs (Tax Identification 
                                                 
48 The available data from international experience clearly indicates that cost of collecting 
taxes in general exceeds the revenue of tax authorities about 1% or even more 
(Sandford,1995).  
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Number) and thus can enter into new transactions with these codes. Another 
recommendation is that the tax authorities should regularly monitor the new 
TINs, i.e. if in a certain period of time (presumably, within three years) no tax 
reports are submitted under this TIN, it should be cancelled (and publicly 
announced). To facilitate the process of re-registration of companies, it is 
suggested to carry it out in three ways: a) by Internet (online regime), b) by mail, 
and c) by visits.49 To ensure the permanent accessibility of companies, they 
should have mail boxes (or e-mail addresses)50 for exchange of information 
between the tax authority and the company. Meantime the mentioned tools will 
serve as a general mechanism for information exchange between state and 
businesses.  
2. When submitting the requested information (tax reports, letters, etc.), it is 
recommended to exclude the possibility of personal contacts between the 
representatives of economic entities and tax authorities, i.e. the information 
should be mailed or e-mailed (introducing the principle of “one window” used 
during the licensing procedure).  
3. It is suggested to change the logic of tax inspection i.e. to eliminate 
implementation of so-called “planned system” of tax collection when regional 
inspectorates receive defined “plan” of expected tax revenues from their 
headquarter and organize their activity based on that plan. This will considerably 
diminish the possibility of opportunistic behaviour of tax authorities and reduce 
relevant transaction costs of economic entities.51   
4. It is suggested to change significantly the institutional structure of tax control and 
the relevant processes. In particular, small, medium-sized and large businesses 
should be clearly identified (the sales volume may be selected as a possible 
identification criterion). It is also recommended to introduce a system of onsite 
                                                 
49 The tax authorities should prepare a special form for re-registration (for submitting 
certain information, which will prove that the given company is running) to be completed 
by companies (the form may be placed on the STS website). The completed form is 
submitted to the tax authority and after a certain period of time the entity shall be provided 
with a new TIN. 
50 This method of information exchange becomes possible with the adoption of the Law on 
Electronic Document and Electronic Signature.   
51 However, we understand that tax authorities will be reluctant to accept this proposal due 
to the fact that the ultimate goal of tax system is to provide appropriate sources for state 
budget, and, from the point of view of tax authorities, the proposed system may impede 
the achievement of this goal.  
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tax control for large taxpayers, i.e. assign one tax officer (replaced every year by 
rotation) to each company, and the tax officer shall work at this company as a 
“tax consultant” and, at the same time, represent the interests of the state (the tax 
officer assumes personal responsibility for the fulfilment of tax obligations by 
this particular company). The introduction of this system will make the operations 
of large businesses utmost transparent in the context of tax compliance and will 
reduce the costs of opportunistic behaviour both for the state and the economic 
entities. The tax officer should be informed about each accounting operation of 
the company.52  When imposing taxes on large businesses, especially on business 
groups, we suggest introducing the idea of “consolidated/combined” taxpayer 
(mainly for VAT and profit tax), i.e. the affiliated enterprises within a business 
group prepare on volunteer basis a consolidated balance sheet, calculate the 
“consolidated tax” and become “consolidated taxpayers” (particularly, during 
vertical integration). This system should be “beneficial” enough for businesses in 
order to ensure their volunteer participation, meantime contributing to the 
identification of business groups existing in the economy and the transparency of 
their activities. It should be mentioned that it is necessary to create a relevant 
legislative framework for the regulation of the activities of business groups. As to 
the medium-sized business, when performing tax control/tax inspections, it is 
recommended to apply the system of random selection of companies subject to 
inspection during the particular year. In other words, the companies subject to 
inspection during the relevant year (based on the institutional capacities of the tax 
authority to perform tax inspections) are selected randomly (using relevant e-
packages and in a transparent manner)  from the list of medium-sized businesses 
at the beginning of the year, and the names of these companies are published in 
media outlets (at the same time, it is prohibited to perform tax inspections at 
companies not included in the given list, except when the inspection at this 
particular company is well-grounded and duly performed). In this case the costs 
related to an adverse selection will decrease, while the overall tax compliance of 
the companies will increase. For small businesses, it is necessary to continue the 
application of an utmost simplified tax regime and, at the same time, monitor it 
regularly through random sampling (selecting a smaller sample). 
5. To undertake necessary measures for further simplification of tax legislation by 
making the relevant provisions more precise and transparent.  
                                                 
52 For instance, all accounting operations should appear on tax officer’s computer and 
there should not be a possibility of backwards transaction. 
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6. It is recommended to stop the practice of advance tax payment clearance in order 
to reduce the entities’ costs incurred due to advance payments collected on some 
taxes; all advanced payments should be refunded in monetary terms (within a 
certain period of time)53.  
7. It is recommended to specify and maximally simplify the hearing procedures for 
tax-related disputes. In this context, the specialization of judges on tax issues is 
considered very important. This would increase the entities’ incentive to defend 
their interests in the court and “do not follow the rules of the game” set by tax 
officers. 
8. It is also recommended to ensure maximum availability of information on tax 
legislation for economic entities, particularly through guidelines, publications and 
Internet. In this context, it is recommended to strengthen the factor of information 
within tax authorities. Particularly, it may be performed by designing a system of 
criteria for evaluation of the work of relevant specialists, which will not be less 
important than the other aspects of tax administration. A separate information 
structure may be established, which will be a body independent from tax 
authorities in terms of the fulfilment of its obligations.  
9. It is recommended to specify the procedure of providing accounting services by 
specialized structures, which would contribute to the decrease of the costs of 
measurement for economic entities. 
10. The changes in the tax control system, particularly the onsite regime for tax 
control, the application of random selection mechanism for selection of 
companies to be subjected to inspection, as well as possible changes in the tax 
information system shall lead to structural reorganization of the tax system 
itself.54  
11. To simplify the VAT calculation and supervision procedures, we recommend 
issuing special tax forms that are numbered and carbonised, and making them 
available for sale. Any transaction that results in tax obligations on VAT implies 
that at least four such forms should be completed and distributed to the parties 
involved (two copies for each party). Then each party sends one copy of this form 
                                                 
53 In this case, it would be more difficult to persuade the entities into paying advance tax 
payments. 
54 This issue is also actual within the context of an overall low level of productivity of tax 
officers’ work.  
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to the tax authority. This would enable the tax authority to carry out the so called 
“mirror screening”, i.e. check “face-to-face” the accuracy of the forms filed by 
both parties. 
12. Finally, it is recommended to regularly conduct similar studies which will allow 
disclosing current issues related to tax administration and develop appropriate 
measures for their minimization and further elimination.   
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Annex 1 
 
1. Cost of obtaining information 
 
 COI = D + P + C + T 
 
Where` COI - Costs of obtaining information, 
 D – expenditure on all necessary documents,  
 P – expenditure on publications and e-packages on tax legislation, 
 C – expenditure on consultancy,  
 T-  expenses on personnel training 
 
 
2. Cost of negotiations 
 
NCS = SM x 12 
 
Where ` NCS – negotiation costs on extra salary, 
   SM – extra salary in monthly bases, 
   12 – number of months.    
 
 
The factor of time which is necessary for establishment of good relations with tax 
authority can be measured through the formula shown below 
 
T = Ct x n 
 
Where` T – overall duration of time, 
  Ct – duration of time needed for setting up the contact, 
 N – total number of contacts which is necessary for achieving anticipated positive 
results. 
 
The calculation of negotiation costs for having good relations with tax authority implies 
the formula below: 
 
NCR = CC x F 
 
Where` NCR – negotiation costs on establishment of good relations, 
    CC – “costs” of contact,  
 24
 F – frequency of contacts per annum. 
 
 
3. Cost of measurement 
COM = ∑ +S+ E 
=
n
i
xTpAi
1
)(
Where` COM – costs of measurement 
Ai – annual salary of accountants and other professional staff members55, 
 n – number of accountants and other professional staff members,  
 Tp –ratio of time spent by economic entities 
 S – expenditures on accounting software 
 E – other expenditures made by economic entity. 
 
 
4. Cost of protection of property rights 
 COPPRL = (( ) x T / 365)) + E ∑
=
n
i
Li
1
 
Where` COPPRL - costs of protection of property rights during lawsuits,  
 Li – annual salary of lawyers and other professional staff members, 
 n – number of lawyers and other professional staff members, 
           T – the length of lawsuits in days, 
           365 – number of days in year, 
           E – other expenses. 
 
For estimation of transaction costs during tax inspection process we use the following 
formula: 
     COPPRT = (( ) x T / 365)) + E ∑
=
n
i
Ai
1
 
Where` COPPRT - costs of protection of property rights during tax inspection,  
Ai – annual salary of accountants and other professional staff members, 
 n – number of accountants and other professional staff members,  
           T – the length of tax inspection in days, 
            365 – number of days per year. 
            E – other expenses.    
 
Regarding to estimation of an extra salary paid to a skilled accountant, it can be measured 
by the formula below: 
COPPRA = SM x 12 
 
Where `COPPRA – costs of protection of property rights on extra salary 
    SM – extra salary in monthly base, 
   12 – number of months. 
                                                 
55 Calculating the salary of economic entity’s staff, it should be considered that the staff is 
responsible for preparation of documents to be submitted to the Social Insurance Fund, 
therefore a special coefficient for time proportion should be introduced.   
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5. Cost of opportunistic behavior 
 
 OPCA = A x (P x T/ 365) 
 
Where` OPCA – costs of opportunistic behavior connected with advance payment to state 
budget, 
A – amount of advance payment,   
P – annual interest rate (%) of state treasury bills or bank deposits, 
T – duration of time in days (duration of time until tax clearing is fulfilled), the 
interest rate is applied, 
365 – number of days per year.   
 
 OPCV = V x (P x T/ 365) 
 
Where` OPCV – costs of opportunistic behavior connected with VAT reimbursement by 
tax authority,  
V– amount of VAT which is subject to reimbursement,   
P – annual interest rate (%) of state treasury bills or bank deposits, 
T – duration of time in days (total period of reimbursement) the rate is applied, 
365 – number of days per year.  
 
OPCP= P x (R x T/ 365) 
 
Where` OPCV – costs of opportunistic behavior connected with profit tax reimbursement 
by tax authority,  
V– amount of profit tax which is subject to reimbursement,   
R– annual interest rate (%) of state treasury bills or bank deposits, 
T – duration of time in days (total period of reimbursement) the rate is applied, 
365 – number of days per year.  
 
Total transaction costs can be calculated through the formula. 
 
TCT =  ∑
=
m
j
ETC
1
Where` TCT – total transaction costs, 
TCE – transaction costs for economic entities, 
 j – types of transaction costs for economic entity, 
  m – number of types of transaction costs for economic entity. 
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Annex 2 
Sample selection and questionnaire design 
 
To apply in practice the aforementioned methodology, i.e. to provide a quantitative 
estimation of transaction costs, a survey has been conducted among relevant enterprises.56 
It was decided to conduct “face-to-face” interviews with business representatives.57 The 
database of the State Tax Service of Armenia has been used as a source for relevant data, 
and the sample for the survey has been designed based on the mentioned database. 
AEPLAC has officially requested the mentioned body to provide the relevant data. In the 
first stage, the State Tax Service provided contact data on 500 Yerevan-based companies 
(excluded individual entrepreneurs).58  The criterion for random selection of these 500 
enterprises was the fact that these companies had, at least once, paid taxes or filed a tax 
report. During the first screening of the data, it appeared that nearly 90% of enterprises 
included in the sample could not be surveyed.59 As the number of selected entities was 
only 54 (11%) and it was unreasonable to carry out the survey due to a small sample, it 
was decided to request new data from the State Tax Service. This time the criterion for 
enterprise selection was specified more precisely and the sample was selected from the 
enterprises that submitted tax reports in the third quarter of 2004. The preliminary analysis 
of 794 enterprises selected by this criterion detected 515 running enterprises (65.3% of 
sample)60, only 306 of which (38.7%) were willing to participate in survey. This means 
                                                 
56 For that purposes AEPLAC has announced official tender to select a specialized 
company. 
57 Even though for these kind of purposes it is widely accepted to conduct mail surveys, 
nevertheless the latter would be less effective in Armenia, considering the overall business 
culture and, especially, the attitude of businesses towards tax administration issues.   
58 Taking into consideration budgetary constrains, as well as the fact that the vast majority 
of businesses are located (or at least have official representatives) in Yerevan, it was 
decided to conduct the survey only in Yerevan. 
59 The reasons are as follows: a number of companies had stopped operating or were 
liquidated, the contact data on other companies appeared to be wrong, and etc. 
60 35% of companies included in the sample (or 279 companies) were either liquidated 
long ago, closed and not operating, or provided wrong contact data (the telephone number 
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that of nearly 1300 enterprises only 328 (25.2%)61 were available for survey.  This 
indicator itself accounts for about 0.8% of total population (this is believed to be an 
adequate figure for such surveys). 62
The questionnaire has been designed so as to cover approximately all necessary questions 
for estimation of transactions costs. The enterprises were classified according to field of 
activity, turnover volume, number of employees and volume of paid taxes. Other 
questions describing the overall attitude of enterprises towards tax authorities, tax 
legislation and etc. were also included in the questionnaire. Further analysis evidenced that 
these supplementary questions were indispensable for cross-tab analysis and helped to 
reveal useful conclusions.    
With respect to the survey process itself, it should be mentioned that it was a rather 
difficult task and the interviewers faced serious constraints. The reports prepared by the 
interviewers clearly show that the main problem was to persuade the representatives of 
companies to cooperate, since some of them did not believe in the anonymity of the survey 
or considered the requested data to be commercial secrets.63 In some cases the 
interviewers had to visit a particular company several times because the managers or chief 
accountants did not have “enough” time to answer the questions of the questionnaire. In 
many cases the interviewers failed to “get hold of” the chief accountants because they 
were working at several places. There were companies that refused to answer any question 
when informed about the survey purpose, and in some cases the interviewers were 
addressed in an impolite manner. Indeed, there were companies that were glad to 
cooperate within the scope of the survey since they thought this project could really be 
important for promoting reforms in tax administration. 
                                                                                                                                                   
was wrong or did not exist, or the telephone was out of order; there was not such company 
at the indicated address). 
61 It needs to be clarified that only 22 out of 54 entities identified during the first stage 
agreed to participate in survey. However, in order to ensure the homogeneity of the 
sample, the data on these companies have not been included in the analyses of survey 
findings and only the data on 306 companies have been taken into account.  
62 According to the available data, the number of enterprises actually paying taxes in 
Armenia reached to approximately 41,000 in 2003-2004. 
International experience shows that this proportion is within a representative range. For 
instance, only 339 entities out of 1,200 have been surveyed during the similar study 
conducted in Croatia. The surveyed entities accounted for 0.48% of the total (70,179 
companies) and it was considered to be a representative sample (see Helena Blazic “Tax 
Compliance Costs of Companies in Croatia”). 
63 This was an actual issue for the survey conducted in Croatia (see footnote 36) as well. 
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Annex 3 
 
        
                                                                                             Transaction costs as a % share of taxes 
paid 
 
Number of 
employees 
Average 
amount of 
taxes paid 
Average 
transaction 
costs 
Transaction costs as % share 
of taxes paid 
1 258,564 209,738 81 
1-5 750,852 197,013 26 
6-10 3,504,061 360,571 10 
11-50 6,973,927 450,788 6 
51-100 7,147,719 717,867 10 
more than 101 31,762,083 1,394,313 4 
Not answered 6,354,367 298,660 5 
Total 4,845,175 396,706 8 
 
       
             Transaction costs as a % share of taxes paid 
 
Sales volume 
Average 
amount of 
paid taxes 
Average 
transaction 
costs 
Transaction costs as a % 
share of  taxes paid 
up to  1mln 137,455 84,559 62 
1.1-5mln 490,490 237,849 48 
5.1-10mln 815,252 240,268 29 
10.1-50mln 2,508,045 416,134 17 
50.1-500mln 14,320,524 1,027,492 7 
more than 500 mln 75,958,333 1,638,756 2 
Not answered 1,032,193 274,939 27 
Total 4,845,175 396,706 8 
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Annex 4 
 
Indicators of tax administration efficiency in CIS countries 
 
Indicators 
 GDP for 
2003 
(thousand 
USD) 
 GDP for 
2002 
(thousand 
USD) 
GDP % 
change* 
Tax collections 
for 2003 
(thousand 
USD) 
Tax 
collections 
for 2002 
(thousand 
USD) 
% change in 
tax revenues 
for 2002-
2003 
Tax 
administr. 
costs for  
2003  
(thousand 
USD) 
Tax 
administr. 
costs for  
2002  
(thousand 
USD) 
% change in tax 
administr. costs 
in 2002-2003 
Armenia 2,795,470 2,319,629 20.5 203,326 180,895 12.4 5,665 2,909 94.7 
Azerbaijan 7,120,272 6,115,267 16.4 836,260 694,568 20.4 6,943 5,600 23.6 
Belarus 17,501,550 14,306,457 22.3 5,929,579 4,600,139 28.9 30,318 23,873 27.1 
Georgia 3,964,884 3,404,886 16.4 581,525 521,547 11.5 7,051 7,580 -7,5 
Kazakhstan 29,748,601 24,636,465 20.8 7,543,230 5,530,227 36.4 24,419 29,791 -22,1 
Kyrgyzstan 1,912,006 1,605,939 19.1 169,678 141,990 19.5 3,956 3,564 11,3 
Moldova 1,957,802 1,623,842 20.6 256,261 205,997 24.4 5,363 5,012 6,5 
Russia 433,660,365 345,588,517 25.5 87,089,399 74,371,818 17.1 1,120,137 903,336 24,3 
Tajikistan 1,560,000 1,211,775 28.7 115,341 95,166 21.2 880 786 12,2 
Ukraine 49,534,033 42,397,672 16.8 8,635,661 7,615,222 13.4 217,765 172,830 25,9 
* Here the % change in nominal GDP is presented without considering the effect of inflation. 
 
 
 Indicators of tax administration efficiency in CIS countries 
 
Indicators 
Net tax 
revenues for 
2003 
(thousand  
USD)  
Net tax 
revenues for 
2002 
(thousand 
USD)  
%  change in net 
tax revenues in 
2002-2003 
Tax buoyancy  
(% change in tax 
revenues / % 
change in GDP) 
Cost of 
collection 
ratio for 2003 
Cost of 
collection 
ratio for 
2002 
% change in  
cost of 
collection ratio 
in 2002-2003 
% change in tax 
revenues / % change 
in administrative 
costs 
Armenia 197,661 177,985 11,1 0,6 2,8 1,6 0,7 0,1 
Azerbaijan 829,317 688,969 20,4 1,2 0,8 0,8 0,0 0,9 
Belarus 5,899,260 4,576,266 28,9 1,3 0,5 0,5 0,0 1,1 
Georgia 574,474 513,968 11,8 0,7 1,2 1,5 -0,2 -1,5 
Kazakhstan 7,518,811 5,500,436 36,7 1,8 0,3 0,5 -0,4 -1,6 
Kyrgyzstan 165,722 138,426 19,7 1,0 2,3 2,5 -0,1 1,7 
Moldova 250,898 200,986 24,8 1,2 2,1 2,4 -0,1 3,8 
Russia 85,969,262 73,468,482 17,0 0,7 1,3 1,2 0,1 0,7 
Tajikistan 114,461 94,380 21,3 0,7 0,8 0,8 -0,1 1,7 
Ukraine 8,417,896 7,442,392 13,1 0,8 2,5 2,3 0,1 0,5 
 
 
 
 30
 31
 
 
 
   Average TC by the group( AMD)    Annex 5  
             
By number of employees            
             
  
Costs of obtaining information   Measurement costs  Negotiation costs  
  Number of respondents 
As % in 
total Volume As % in total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume As % in total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume 
As % in 
total 
1 19 out of 19 100,0 82711 39,4 12 out of 19 63,2 192750 91,9 1 out of 19 5,3 80000 38 
1-5 99 out of 103 96,1 26199 13,3 84 out of 103 81,6 198107 100,6 1 out of 103 0,97 240000 122 
6-10 47 out of 49 95,9 38904 10,8 45 out of 49 91,8 327806 90,9       0 
11-50 74 out of 77 96,1 76019 16,9 70 out of 77 90,9 377484 83,7 3 out of 77 3,9 346667 77 
51-100 33 out of 33 100,0 79758 11,1 31 out of 33 93,9 506629 70,6 2 out of 33 6,1 455000 63 
101 and more 12 out of 12 100,0 513417 36,8 12 out of 12 100,0 870308 62,4       0 
Not answered  11 out of 13 84,6 35364 11,8 6 out of 13 46,2 474167 158,8       0 
Total average 295 out of 306 96,4 70512 17,8 
260 out of 
306 85,0 342782 86,4 
7 out of 
306 2,3 324286 82 
 
Costs of protecting property rights Costs of opportunistic behavour Total average  
Number of 
respondents As % in total Volume 
As % in 
total 
Number of 
respondents As % in total Volume 
As % in 
total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume 
As % in 
total 
52,9 2 out of 19 10,5 10037 5 4 out of 19 21,1 113 0,05 19 out of 19 100,0 209738 
3 out of 103 2,9 80396 41 27 out of 103 26,2 14054 7,13 102 out of 103 99,0 197013 49,7 
90,9 4 out of 49 8,2 150493 42 18 out of 49 36,7 6983 1,94 48 out of 49 98,0 360571 
113,6 4 out of 77 5,2 239110 53 21 out of 77 27,3 31668 7,02 77 out of 77 100,0 450788 
181,0 2 out of 33 6,1 538000 75 8 out of 33 24,2 420764 58,61 33 out of 33 100,0 717867 
351,5 1 out of 12 8,3 57205 4 3 out of 12 25,0 23288 1,67 12 out of 12 100,0 1394313 
75,3 1 out of 13 7,7 365 0,12 2 out of 13 15,4 25445 8,52 11 out of 13 84,6 298660 
17 out 306 5,6 173720 44 83 out of 306 27,1 56114 14,15 
302 out of 
306 98,7 396706   
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By sales volume             
             
  
Costs of obtaining information  Measurement costs  Negotiation costs  
  
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume As % in total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume As % in total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume 
As % in 
total 
Up to 1 mln 14 out of 14 100 9500 11 9 out of 14 64 116389 138         
1,1-5 mln 35 out of 36 97,2222 25606 11 30 out of 36 83 224833 95 2 out of 36 6 190000 80 
5,1-10 mln 22 out of 22 100 23073 10 21 out of 22 95 221619 92         
10,1-50 mln 71 out of 72 98,6111 61177 15 68 out of 72 94 346478 83 2 out 72 3 450000 108 
50,1-500 mln 27 out of 29 93,1034 162278 16 29 out of 29 100 787103 77     310000 30 
500,1 and more 7 out of 7 100 754571 46 6 out of 7 86 980417 60       0 
Not answered 119 out of 126 94,4444 44178 16 97 out of 126 77 251627 92 2 out of 126 2 340000 124 
Total average 295 out of 306 96,4052 70512 18 
260 out of 
306 85,0 342782 86 
7 out of 
306   324286 82 
 
Costs of protecting property rights Costs of opportunistic behavour Total average  
Number of 
respondents As % in total Volume 
As % in 
total 
Number of 
respondents As % in total Volume 
As % in 
total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume 
As % in 
total 
21,3 2 out of 14 14 447 0,5 4 out of 14 28,6 608 0,7 14 out of 14 100,0 84559 
60,0 3 out of 36 8 180122 75,7 6 out of 36 16,7 167 0,1 36 out of 36 100,0 237849 
60,6 1 out of 22 5 120000 49,9 6 out of 22 27,3 716 0,3 22 out of 22 100,0 240268 
104,9 5 out of 72 7 165125 39,7 28 out of 72 38,9 11854 2,8 72 out of 72 100,0 416134 
259,0 3 out of 29 10 418667 40,7 17 out of 29 58,6 60222 5,9 29 out of 29 100,0 1027492 
413,1 2 out of 7 29 95178 5,8 3 out of 7 42,9 38813 2,4 7 out of 7 100,0 1638756 
1 out of 126 1 20000 7,3 19 out of 126 15,1 167243 60,8 122 out of 126 100,0 274939 69,3 
17 out 306 6 173720 43,8 83 out of 306 27 56114 14,1 
302 out of 
306 98,69 396706   
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By the volume of taxes paid            
             
  
Costs of obtaining information  Measurement costs  Negotiation costs  
  
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume As % in total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume As % in total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume 
As % in 
total 
Up to 100 thous 13 out of 14 92,8571 52462 33 9 out of 14 64 174778 109         
100-500 thous. 60 out of 60 100 49000 21 51 out of 60 85 205680 88         
500 - 5mln 75 out of 79 94,9367 49596 12 75 out of 79 95 363487 89 2 out of 79 3 220000 54 
5 mln - 20 mln 18 out of 18 100 155778 22 18 out of 18 100 459861 65         
20 mln and more 9 out of 9 100 647000 29 9 out of 9 100 1515528 68 1 out of 9 11 310000 14 
Not answered 120 out of 126 95,2381 40270 13 98 out of 126 78 284509 90 4 out of 126 3 380000 121 
Total average 295 out of 306 96,4052 70512 18 
260 out of 
306 85,0 342782 86 
7 out of 
306 2,3 324286 82 
 
Costs of protecting property rights Costs of opportunistic behavour Total average 
Number of 
respondents As % in total Volume 
As % in 
total 
Number of 
respondents As % in total Volume 
As % in 
total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume 
As % in 
total 
40,6         4 out of 14 28,57 31 0,02 14 out of 14 100,00 161080 
58,9 4 out of 60 7 130205 55,75 13 out of 60 22 4805 2,06 60 out of 60 100,00 233550 
103,4 3 out of 79 4 1875 0,46 27 out of 79 34,18 20508 5,00 78 out of 79 98,73 410007 
179,2 3 out of 18 17 418667 58,91 9 out of 18 50,00 50641 7,13 18 out of 18 100,00 710737 
560,2 1 out of 9 11 57205 2,57 4 out of 9 21,05 42466 1,91 9 out of 9 100,00 2222202 
6 out of 126 5 185598 58,89 26 out of 126 20,63 131367 41,68 123 out of 126 97,62 315149 79,4 
17 out 306 6 173720 43,79 83 out of 306 27 56114 14,15 
302 out of 
306 98,69 396706   
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By the field of 
activity             
             
  
Costs of obtaining information  Measurement costs  Negotiation costs  
  
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume As % in total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume As % in total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume 
As % in 
total 
Industry 33 out of 34 97,0588 232545 36 32 out of 34 94 353922 56 2 out of 34 6 450000 71 
Agriculture 1 out of 1 100 1500 1 1 out of 1 100 108000 99       0 
Trade 79 out of 81 97,5309 29451 11 64 out of 81 79 281539 106 1 out of 81 1 140000 53 
Services 155 out of 161 96,2733 60348 15 137 out of 161 85 343564 88 3 out of 161 2 306667 79 
Construction 15 out of 16 93,75 54267 12 16 out of 16 100 366250 82       0 
Other 8 out of 8 100 71375 8 6 out of 8 75 1001667 115 1 out of 8 13 310000 35 
Not answered 4 out of 5 80 15000 7,6 4 out of 4 100,0 183250 92,4     0 0 
Total average 295 out of 306 96,4052 70512 18 
260 out of 
306 85,0 342782 86 
7 out of 
306 2,3 324286 82 
 
Costs of protecting property rights Costs of opportunistic behavour Total average 
Number of 
respondents As % in total Volume 
As % in 
total 
Number of 
respondents As % in total Volume 
As % in 
total 
Number of 
respondents 
As % in 
total Volume 
As % in 
total 
160,7 5 out of 34 15 251036 39 15 out of 34 44 34530 5 34 out of 34 100 637430 
27,6       0       0 1 out of 1 100 109500 
66,7 2 out of 81 2 66986 25 29 out of 81 36 18401 7 80 out of 81 99 264409 
7 out of 161 4 197205 51 27 out of 161 17 119932 31 159 out of 161 99 389691 98,2 
112,3 3 out of 161 2 61218 14 6 out of 161 4 45405 10 16 out of 161 10 445630 
220,1       0 5 out of 8 63 19027 2 8 out of 8 100 873267 
50,0     0 0 1 out of 4 25,0 137 0,07 4 out of 4 100,00 198284 
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17 out 306 6 173720 44 83 out of 306 27 56114 14 302 out of 306 98,69 396706   
 Transaction costs by the group (AMD)         
          Annex 6   
By number of employees           
             
  
Costs of 
obtaining 
information 
As % 
in total 
Measurement 
costs  
As % 
in total 
Negotiation 
costs  
As % in 
total 
Costs of 
protecting 
property 
rights 
As % in 
total 
Costs of 
opportunistic 
behavour 
As % in 
total 
Total 
transaction 
costs  
As % in 
total 
1 1571500 39,4 2313000 58,0 80000 2,0 20073 0,5 452 0,01 3985025 3,3 
1-5 2593700 12,9 16641000 82,8 240000 1,2 241187 1,2 379445 1,9 20095332 16,8 
6-10 1828500 10,6 14751250 85,2   0,0 601973 3,5 125692 0,7 17307414 14,4 
11-50 5625400 16,2 26423850 76,1 1040000 3,0 956438 2,8 665021 1,9 34710710 29,0 
51-100 2632000 11,1 15705487 66,3 910000 3,8 1076000 4,5 3366109 14,2 23689596 19,8 
101 and more 6161000 36,8 10443690 62,4   0,0 57205 0,3 69863 0,4 16731758 14,0 
Not answered 389000 11,8 2845000 86,6   0,0 365 0,01 50890 1,5 3285256 2,7 
Total 20801100 17,4 89123277 74,4 2270000 1,9 2953242 2,5 4657473 3,9 119805092   
By sales volume             
             
  
Costs of 
obtaining 
information 
As % in 
total 
Measurement 
costs  
As % in 
total 
Negotiation 
costs  
As % in 
total 
Costs of 
protecting 
property 
rights 
As % in 
total 
Costs of 
opportunistic 
behavour 
As % in 
total 
Total 
transaction 
costs 
As % in 
total 
Up to 1 mln 133000 11,2 1047500 88,5   0,0 895 0,1 2433 0,2 1183828 1,0 
1,1-5 mln 896200 10,5 6745000 78,8 380000 4,4 540365 6,3 1000 0,01 8562565 7,1 
5,1-10 mln 507600 9,6 4654000 88,0   0,0 120000 2,3 4295 0,1 5285895 4,4 
10,1-50 mln 4343600 14,5 23560500 78,6 900000 3,0 825626 2,8 331914 1,1 29961640 25,0 
50,1-500 mln 4381500 14,7 22826000 76,6 310000 1,0 1256000 4,2 1023781 3,4 29797281 24,9 
500,1  and more 5282000 46,0 5882500 51,3   0,0 190356 1,7 116438 1,0 11471295 9,6 
Not answered 5257200 15,7 24407777 72,8 680000 2,0 20000 0,1 3177612 9,5 33542589 28,0 
Total 20801100 17,4 89123277 74,4 2270000 1,9 2953242 2,5 4657473 3,9 119805092   
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By the volume of taxes paid            
             
  
Costs of 
obtaining 
information 
As % in 
total 
Measurement  
costs  
As % in 
total 
Negotiation 
costs  
As % in 
total 
Costs of 
protecting 
property 
rights 
As % in 
total 
Costs of 
opportunistic 
behavour 
As % in 
total 
Total 
transaction 
costs  
As % in 
total 
Up to 100 thous 682000 30,2 1573000 69,8   0,0   0,0 123 0,0 2255123 1,9 
100-500 thous. 2940000 21,0 10489687 74,9   0,0 520822 3,7 62462 0,4 14012971 11,7 
500 -5mln 3719700 11,6 27261500 85,2 440000 1,4 5626 0,0 553709 1,7 31980534 26,7 
5 mln -20 mln 2804000 21,9 8277500 64,7   0,0 1256000 9,8 455767 3,6 12793267 10,7 
20 mln and more 5823000 29,1 13639750 68,2 310000 1,6 57205 0,3 169863 0,8 19999818 16,7 
Not answered 4832400 12,5 27881840 71,9 1520000 3,9 1113589 2,9 3415549 8,8 38763378 32,4 
Total 20801100 17,4 89123277 74,4 2270000 1,9 2953242 2,5 4657473 3,9 119805092   
 
By the field of activity            
             
  
Costs of 
obtaining 
information  
As % in 
total 
Measurement 
costs  
As % in 
total 
Negotiation 
costs  
As % in 
total 
Costs of 
protecting 
property 
rights 
As % in 
total 
Costs of 
opportunistic 
behavour 
As % in 
total 
Total 
transaction 
costs 
As % in 
total 
Industry 7674000 35,4 11325500 52,3 900000 4,2 1255178 5,8 517952 2,4 21672630 18,1 
Agriculture 1500 1,4 108000 98,6   0,0   0,0   0,0 109500 0,1 
Trade 2326600 11,0 18018500 85,2 140000 0,7 133973 0,6 533640 2,5 21152712 17,7 
Services 9354000 15,1 47068277 76,0 920000 1,5 1380438 2,2 3238176 5,2 61960891 51,7 
Construction 814000 11,4 5860000 82,2   0,0 183653 2,6 272432 3,8 7130084 6,0 
Other 571000 8,2 6010000 86,0 310000 4,4   0,0 95137 1,4 6986137 5,8 
Not answered 60000 7,6 733000 92,4   0,0   0,0 137 0,0 793137 0,7 
Total 20801100 17,4 89123277 74,4 2270000 1,9 2953242 2,5 4657473 3,9 119805092   
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